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NO TES
OBTAINING BY FALSE PROMISES: A PROPOSED STATUTE

I
The purpose of this comment is to urge the desirability of broadening the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses to include
the making of false promises. The traditional concept of criminal
"false pretenses" requires an intention to deprive the owner of his

property coupled with a misrepresentation of fact which induces the
victim to transfer ownership., If the wrongdoer does not misrepresent
any fact but makes only a false promise, that is, 2misrepresents his
intention, he is not subject to criminal prosecution.
The distinction drawn between misrepresentations of fact and
false promises has no foundation in degree of moral guilt. The intent to deprive another of his property is present in both cases, and
the reliance on the misrepresentation by which one is deprived of
his property is a hurt to that individual as a member of society. The
need for legislation to redefine the law and the hopelessness of relying on the judiciary to do so is apparent upon consideration of
court activity. In only a few cases have they held that the crime of
obtaining property by false pretenses can be made out when the de-

fendant's misrepresentation consisted only of a false promise3 Entrenched in almost two centuries of jurisprudence excluding false
promises from the criminal law, the judicial attitude can only be one
of reluctance to tamper with the law.
The opposition to the expansion of the criminal law of obtaining
by false pretenses beyond its present scope of misrepresentation of
fact comes mainly from two groups whose membership is not necessarily exclusive: local prosecuting attorneys, and those who fear that
lScarlett v. State, 25 Fla. 717, 6 So. 767 (1889); Regina v. Woodman, 14 Cox. C.C.
179 (1879); CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES §359(c).
21n addition to the intent to deprive, the crucial element of the supposedly re-

lated crime of larceny by trick is an intention by the victim to give up possession
of the property. With respect to the misrepresentation, it may be one of fact
or intent.
3People v. Gordon, 71 Cal. App.2d 606, 163 P.2d 110 (1945); State v. Nicholls,
Houst. Cr. 114 (Del. 1862); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116, 147 N.E.
588 (1925); Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 Mass. 588, 27 N.E. 593 (1891); Commonwealth v. Walker, 108 Mass. 309 (1871); State v. McMahon, 49 RI. 107, 140 AUt.
359 (1928). In Rex v. Bancroft, 26 T.L.R. 10-CCA (1909), the court allowed the
jury to pass on whether the statement was of a fact or intention.
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an expansion of the law in this area will jeopardize legitimate
business.
The local prosecuting official is reluctant to have his office become
an agency for the collection of debts. 4 A, a loan office, has a debt from

D which is long overdue. Thinking that it may be possible to force
D to pay his debt and at the same time save the legal expenses of
collection, A makes out an affidavit which states that when D borrowed the money he did not intend to pay it back, although he represented that he would. In this situation, the prosecuting attorney
does not wish to and fortunately cannot accept the affidavit alleging
the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses because the alleged misrepresentations were about D's intention and not about an
objective fact, for example, the amount of D's bank deposits. The
prosecuting attorney is of the opinion that if the crime is broadened
to include misrepresentations of intent his office will be flooded with
this type of litigation. However, an accidental change in the facts
may cause him to feel differently about the particular case. B is a
wealthy widow. On the strength of D's promise alone, she is induced
to give him $300 to use in a stock venture. D promises to return
$350 to her. D never pays his debt and the evidence clearly shows
that he had no intention of returning any amount to her.5 The prosecuting attorney, however much he desires to bring action against D,
is barred because the scope of the crime of obtaining property by
false pretenses is not sufficiently broad. 6
The second group of opponents are those who contend that legitimate business will be jeopardized by a weapon in the hands of the
prosecuting official to be used against contracting parties who in
4A former assistant district attorney in the City of New Orleans, when asked
his opinion of the expansion which had already taken place in Louisiana, LA.
REV. STAT. tit. 14, §67 (1950), quickly replied that "The D.A. could never use
that law; the office would be flooded with calls from loan offices with bad debts."
5Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946), 21 TULANE L. REV. 639
(1947).
6A prosecuting attorney, in this case, may attempt to bring it within the scope
of larceny by trick and show that the victim intended to give up only possession
of the money, People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 155 N.E. 670 (1927); People v.
Miller, 169 N.Y. 339, 62 N.E. 418 (1902); or may allege that the defendant implicitly misrepresented his ability to perform the promise-a fact, State v. Colly,
39 La. Ann. 841, 2 So. 496 (1887). But cf. People ex rel. Courtney v. Sullivan, 363
Ill. 34, 1 N.E.2d 206 (1936); Regina v. Gordon, 23 Q.B.D. 354 (1889) (defendant
stated he "was prepared" to pay).
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good faith have been unable to keep their agreements. Legitimate
business transactions, it is insisted, ought not to be hampered by possible criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the businessman who is
not prosecuted but against whom charges are brought may suffer irreparably from the publicity. Subsequent acquittal or nolle prosequi
may not undo the harm received by the institution of charges.
II
The proposed crime of obtaining property by false promise can
be divided into three material elements: (1) the defendant's intention
to deprive the victim of his property (the mental element), (2) the
false promise, and (3) the reliance of the victim on the false promise.
These three elements will be discussed in order to distinguish their
materiality from the evidentiary matter necessary to establish the existence of each beyond a reasonable doubt.
The mental element is the intent of the accused to commit the
crime with which he is charged. He must have specifically intended
to deprive the complainant of his property at the time he acquired it. Without this element there can be no successful prosecution. The necessary mental element is established primarily by the
falsity of the promise which induced the victim to transfer ownership.
There are many means of depriving another of his property. The
making of a false promise is one. When a person makes a promise
which he never intends to fulfill and believes that it will cause the
victim to give up his property, he intends to deprive the victim of
the property and the mental element is established. Any matter relevant to the allegation that the defendant made a false promise also
tends to prove the allegation that the defendant intended to deprive
the victim of his property.
The false promise element of the crime may be analyzed according
to the following variations: (1) a false promise to give value in return, (2) an additional false promise, and (3) the nature of the promise in either case.
In the first category, let us assume that D promises A that if A
gives him $25 D will procure the release of A's friend who is presently
in custody of the local marshal. Relying on this promise, A turns
over $25 to D. D does nothing at all about the release of A's friend.7
7These are essentially the facts of State v. Colly, 39 La. Ann. 841, 2 So. 496 (1887).
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The failure to fulfill his promise to A is not material. Theoretically
the crime of obtaining property by false promises, like the related
crime of larceny by trick, is effected at the time D is given title to or
possession of A's money. The fact that D did not fulfill his promise
is relevant to the material proposition that D's promise was false
when made. The falsity of the promise, in turn, goes towards the establishment of the necessary mental element - an intention to defraud.
The second category involves the type of behavior in which the
defendant makes two or more promises which induce the victim to
surrender title to his property. D promises A that if A gives him
enough money he will use the money to great advantage in a business
transaction and that he will return the money to A after completion
of the activity. A gives D the money. D does not use the money in
the proposed business transaction and never returns the money to A.
A jury may reasonably conclude from this evidence that D never
intended to carry out his promise, that is, that it was a false promise.
If D did use the money in one transaction,$ the jury may still conclude that D had no intention to fulfill his promises to A, but the
prosecution does not have the added evidence of D's failure to keep
the auxiliary promise to help it establish D's original intent to defraud - the mental element.

A third category may be found superimposed upon either of the
above situations. In many cases, from the nature of the promise
which the defendant made, the jury will want the defendant to explain away his alleged bad faith. Legally the burden of proving the
defendant's intention to defraud will not shift from the prosecution.
But psychologically if the jury believes that the defendant was incapable of carrying out an improbable promise, they are going to expect him to point out how and when he was going to perform the
promise. D makes a promise to sell A a magic rod that divines hidden treasures and thereby induces A to give him money. The promise
is not kept.9 In addition to the fact that the promise was not fulfilled,
the prosecution finds additional evidence to establish the material
element that the promise was false from the nature of the promise
itself. The fact that the fulfillment of the promise was hardly possible
and the defendant believed that it could be accomplished would be
sSee note 5 supra.
9State v. Antoine, 155 La. 120, 98 So. 861 (1924).
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further evidence to support the first as well as the second element.
To go back to the case of D's promise to cause the release of A's
friend from jail, if the local prosecuting attorney were able to offer
evidence that there was a bond set for the release of the prisoner,
that the practice of the local marshal in allowing the release of persons held in his custody was in accordance with legal requirements,
and that the time within which D promised to procure the release was
impossibly short, he would prove that D could not perform the
promise and thus strengthen his allegation of the falsity of the promise
and D's intent to defraud A. Thus the circumstances relevant to the
possibility of the fulfillment of the promise would shift the psychological burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant, and the
jury would expect an explanation of nonperformance from the
defendant.
Cases of a more commercial nature will offer a more difficult problem. The possibilities of the fulfillment of the defendant's promise
broadens in this area and the ability to explain away his action as
poor commercial judgment is thereby increased. This is one reason
why those who fear the jeopardizing of business interests are unjustified. The local prosecuting attorney has great discretion in choosing
the cases which he wishes to prosecute. If he believes that evidence
is insufficient to justify the time spent in the preparation and prosecution of a cause, he need not accept an affidavit made out even by a
good faith party. To establish the commission of a crime there must
be evidence that will prevent any reasonable doubt arising in the
minds of the jurors.10 This type of discretion is used by a prosecuting
attorney in all cases, and little reason is offered to show that he cannot and will not exercise it within the proposed crime. Should political pressure be exerted to compel a prosecuting official to accept an
affidavit alleging the proposed crime in a case where there is insufficient evidence, the official, it must be remembered, is still a lawyer
and is aware of statutory requirements. Above all, he is answerable
to the electorate, part of which may have been hurt by his abuse of

IoIn the crimes of larceny by trick and embezzlement, the defendant is given
possession of the property and it is to be used within a scope of authority. In the
proposed crime, the victim intends to give up title to the property. Evidence neccessary to establish the commission of the proposed crime will be more difficult
to acquire, since the defendant is not bound by any scope of authority and therefore cannot breach the scope.
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power. Much the same social pressures are exerted in the crime of
rape as may be exercised in this area.
Cases may be found that point out the ability of the prosecutor
to offer evidence other than the defendant's nonperformance in a
bad faith commercial transaction. For example, in Commonwealth
v. Morrison," the defendants were indicted for conspiring to commit
the crime of obtaining by false pretenses. A was a retail merchant.
D had a large store of obsolete spark plugs. D's associates placed
orders with A for the spark plugs and A bought a large stock from D
to fill the orders. A shipped the spark plugs C.O.D. to the other defendants, who did not appear to accept them. With facts presented
tending to prove that D and his associates knew each other and had
been together to a great extent before the beginning of the scheme,
that one defendant placed an order from a hotel room in which he registered for only one night, and that D assured A, after being informed
that the plugs had not been accepted, that there was a ready market for
them, the court allowed the case to go to the jury and stated that the
jury could reasonably find that the defendants placed the orders with
no intention of accepting the spark plugs. The nonperformance
alone would not have been sufficient to allow the case to go to the
jury, but further evidence coupled with the failure to perform allowed the prosecution to succeed in establishing the falsity of the
promise and the defendant's fraudulent intentions.
In commercial cases, the fact that both promises are not performed
or that the promise concerning the return of money or some article
has not been carried out may aid the prosecutor's case along with
the nature of the promise and other facts surrounding the transaction.
The third material element in the proposed crime will be the
reliance of the harmed party on the false promise. As in the crimes
of larceny by trick, where either fact or false promise is employed, or
obtaining by false pretenses, the promise upon which the harmed
party relies must be material to his relinquishing title to or possession of his property, that is, it must be the cause of the giving up
of the property. 12 As an illustration, let us assume that D makes a
promise to A that he will pick up A's packages at a downtown de-

11252 Mass. 116, 147 N.E. 588 (1925).
12Clifton v. State, 76 Fla. 244, 79 So. 707 (1918); CLARK
§365.
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partment store when he passes there next. D then asks A for $10 and
A gives the money to D. Here A does not give the money to D because D promises to pick up some packages for him. A intends to pass
title to the $10 for another reason, and if D does not promise anything
which induces A to give up the money the jury cannot find that A
relied on D's promise.
The jury question will be whether the defendant actually deceived
the other party by the promise. If the promise is absurd, so that no
reasonable man would believe it possible or probable of fulfillment,
the situation may still be that the complainant did in fact believe
that the defendant could fulfill it. The question of the reasonableness
of the complainant's belief in the ability or intention to carry out
his promise will resolve itself into that of whether the complainant
was in fact induced to relinquish title to his property by the particular promise made under relevant circumstances. If the question
were the reasonableness of the promise's fulfillment, the area of hard
cases in which parties are injured because they relied on a foolish
promise would remain uncovered. As Justice Edgerton has stated:13
"In 1821, the fact that 'common prudence and caution would
have prevented any injury' seemed to an English court a good
reason for refusing to penalize an injury which had been intentionally inflicted by a false promise. .

.

. Fools were fair

game though cripples were not. But in modem times, no one.
not talking law would be likely to deny that society should protect mental as well as physical helplessness against intentional
injuries."
Clearly the fact that the promise was impossible or highly improbable of fulfillment may be relevant to the proposition that the
complainant was not deceived by it. On the other hand, the fact
that the injured party surrendered his property will be relevant to
the allegation that he was deceived by the false promise. With this
evidence alone, the jury may find that the accuser was not deceived.
To establish its material allegation beyond a reasonable doubt the
prosecution will have to offer further evidence such as the complainant's mental ability, his action toward third parties in respect to the
13Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion), 21 TULANE L. REv. 639 (1947).
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false promise, and other circumstances tending to show he was in
fact deceived by the promise.
In proving the element of reliance in the loan office type of case,
the prosecuting attorney would obviously have a most difficult job.
And this is another reason why the local prosecutor and those who
fear the jeopardizing of business interests have really little to fear.
The prosecutor will have to show that the lending agency was motivated by the defendant's promise to pay when it gave him the money.
It is suggested, and juries may reasonably consider, that finance companies do not rely on the defendant's promise to pay but upon purely
business motives of profit and loss and attending advertisement. Their
business is the lending of money, and this renders them different from
the ordinary person who is defrauded of his money by a confidence
man.
III
The great increase in complexity of business brought about particularly by the modern corporation has given the confidence man
greater opportunity to accomplish his evil purpose. He is hidden in
the complexity and can carry on his schemes with more facility. Yet
the maker of a false promise is protected by the absence of a criminal
statute because such a statute is thought to be a potentially vicious
weapon against legitimate business. Legitimate business can be better
protected by a proper enforcement of the law to prevent fraudulent
business dealings in which only promises are employed.
The federal mail fraud statute offers such a remedy in limited instances. This statute makes criminal "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or obtaining by false pretenses, representations or promises," 14
in which the mail services of the United States Government are used.
It has been a great deterrent to crime by use of the mails, and no
great injustice has been wrought which would cause a public outcry
for the abolition of the statute. Legitimate business of the complex
twentieth-century commercial world has not been unduly hindered
because this statute broadened the law of obtaining by false pretenses.
It has, on the contrary, acted as a considerable deterrent to morally
1418 U.S.C. §1341 (1946). In Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896),
Mr. Justice Brewer said, ". . . it would strip it of value to confine it to such
cases as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and exclude
those in which is only the allurement of a specious and glittering promise."
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corrupt men who once made their way through the maze of commercial activity. With the further step proposed here, the criminal
law will be sufficiently broadened to refuse sanction to commercial
and noncommercial fraud in which only promises are used.
The proposed statute reads:
If anyone, (1) with the intent to deprive another of any property,
(2) makes a false promise
(3) which induces such person to surrender title to
such property,
he shall be guilty of obtaining by false promises.
RENE AUGUST PASTOREK

Loyola University
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